#AIRBUS COCKPIT REGISTER MANUAL#

The PIC was away from his position and distracted by the conversation with his daughter.ĥ. It was difficult for the co-pilot to detect the disengagement of the autopilot by feel, either because of the small forces on his control column or because he took changing forces to be the result of Eldar's actions

#AIRBUS COCKPIT REGISTER MANUAL#

The co-pilot and PIC may have been unaware of the peculiarities of the declutching function and the actions to be taken in such a situation because of a lack of appropriate information in the flight manual and crew training programme 8.2.7.3., and international recommended practices, could have enabled the crew to detect the disengaged autopilot in a timely manner. The provision of signals in accordance with the requirements of Airworthiness Standard NLGS-3, para. The A310 instrumentation has no declutch warning. The co-pilot and PIC failed to detect the fact that the autopilot had become disconnected from the aileron control linkage, probably because: Application by the outsider and the co-pilot of control forces that interfered with the functioning of the roll channel of the autopilot (and are not recommended in the A310 flight manual), thus overriding the autopilot and disconnecting it from the aileron control linkage.Ĥ. The execution of demonstration manoeuvres that were not anticipated in the flight plan or flight situation, with the PIC operating the autopilot while not at his duty station.ģ. The decision by the PIC to allow an unqualified and unauthorized outsider (his son) to occupy his duty station and intervene in the flying of the aeroplane.Ģ. The A310 disaster was caused by a stall, spin and impact with the ground resulting from a combination of the following factors:ġ. Two minutes and six seconds later the aircraft struck the ground. The bank continued to 90 degrees, the aircraft pitched up steeply with +4,8g accelerations, stalled and entered a spin. The seat of the co-pilot was fully aft, so it took him an additional 2-3 seconds to get to the control wheel.

The A310 started buffeting, which caught the attention of the captain who told the co-pilot to take control while he was trying to regain his seat. when the autopilot wasn't able to maintain altitude. The aircraft then started to bank to the right at 2,5deg/sec, reaching 45deg. Forces on the control wheel increased to 12-13 kg until the torque limiter activated by disconnecting the autopilot servo from the aileron control linkage. As the autopilot attempted to level the aircraft at its programmed heading, it came in conflict with the inputs from the control wheel which was blocked in a neutral position. The captain then demonstrated the same features as he did to his daughter and ended by using the NAV submode to bring the aircraft back on course.

He then turned the wheel slightly (applying a force of between 8-10 kg) and held it in that position for a few seconds before returning the wheel to the neutral position. The captain intended to demonstrate the same manoeuvre when his son asked if he could turn the control wheel. The captain's son then took the left front seat.

She was allowed to sit the left-hand seat while the captain demonstrated some autopilot features, using HDG/S and NAV submodes to alter the heading. The aircraft was en route from Moscow to Hong Kong at 10100 m when, approaching the Novokuznetsk reporting point, the captain's daughter entered the cockpit. Hong Kong-Kai Tak International Airport (HKG/VHHH), Hong Kong Moskva-Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO/UUEE), Russia Accident investigation report completed and information captured

Airbus cockpit register